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Abstract
Recent studies indicate that people nay use their noods 
when making judgments, by interpreting their emotions as 
affective reactions to stimuli in the environment. It has 
also been shown that subjects can be made to ignore these 
feelings if they are encouraged to misattribute them to an 
irrelevant source. In this study, subjects were placed in 
happy or sad moods, and then asked to rate how good and how 
probable various outcomes were for a series of gambles, and 
to indicate how risky they wanted to be in their decisions 
about them. Results showed that the mood of subjects as 
well as the features of the gambles (such as size, result, 
and emphasis on wins or losses) played an interactive role 
in determining if the subjects would opt for certainty or 
risk. Also, some subjects were given a chance to discount 
their feelings. When they did, the misattribution effect 
was observed, under certain conditions, and subjects 
ignored their affect induced by the mood induction in 
making their decisions about the gambles.
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Tha effects of aood on cognition and thought ara 
axtanaiva and varied. Bootion producaa changaa in aocial 
bahavior (e.g., Weyant, 1976), attention (a.g., Iaan & 
Shalker, 1982), memory (a.g., Bower, 1981), riak taking 
(a.g., Iaan 8 Patrick, 1983), deciaion making (a.g., Iaan, 
Maana, Patrick, 8 Novicki, 1982), inforaation acquieition 
(Bataon, Coka, Chard, Smith, 8 Taliafarro, 1979), problem 
solving (a.g., Iaan, Daubman, 8 Novicki, 1987), and 
creativity (a.g., Iaan, Johnaon, Marta, 8 Robinson, 1985).
Thera is little doubt than, that mood plays an 
important role in determining how va act and think in our 
lives. Me axparianca tha affect first hand nearly every 
day. Imagine the following situation:
On your way to your office you meet a good friend of 
youra on the street whom you have not seen in awhile. She 
chats with you for a moment, and with sincerity complements 
you on how good you look. Several momenta later you part 
and continue on your way.
Positive events such as this have a significant effect 
on how people act and view the world. If the previous 
scene had happened to you, chances are you would notice 
other pleasant things about tha day, such as the weather.
4
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If someone elec atoppad you and askad how you war* doing, 
you would aoat likaly raply that you ware, "doing fine," 
with a littla aora anthuaiaaa than you aight ordinarily, 
and you would ba aora likaly to giva aoaaona a hand if they 
needed help (e.g., carrying aoaa packagaa). You night 
conpletely ignore minor unplaaaant avanta that otherwiae 
aight annoy you.
I will axaaina the three priaary thaoriaa about mood's 
affect on cognition. Firat, however, I will daacriba a 
typical atudy parformed to atudy the nood-cognition 
interaction.
lean, Shalkar, Clark, and Karp (1978) performed a atudy 
in a shopping mail, in which subjects wara approached by a 
confederate of the axpariaantar and offered notepads (to 
females) or nail clippers (to aales). About fifty yards 
away, anothar confederate approached the sane subject and 
asked sone questions relating to the performance of the 
subject's automobile and television set.
Subjects who were in good woods (induced by the 
presentation of a notepad or nail clipper) tended to aake 
significantly aora positive judgaents than the control 
group, rating the performance of their cars and televisions 
as more satisfactory.
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This study, typical of studios on mood offacts, 
exhibits several points of interest. First, subjects were 
asked to aake judgments about something from their past - 
their cars and televisions - so evaluations were based on 
memory. Evaluations of objects in memory are not required 
for mood effects, but it is worth noting that these effects 
occur for familiar as well as novel stimuli. The link 
between mood and memory is an important one, so I shall 
examine the effects of mood on memory as it applies to each 
of the theories.
A second feature of the study is that nothing was said 
about televisions or cars until judgments were asked for. 
That is, the interviewers did not ask subjects to think 
about all of the positive aspects of these items and then 
make a judgment. In some way, the positive mood induced by 
the notepad or nail clippers affected evaluations of the 
completely unrelated cars and televisions. This has been 
referred to as "priming," and I shall examine it 
extensively, as it is the backbone for one of the major 
theories about the effects of mood.
Finally, notice the extent of the effect involved. 
Consider that a TV and a car are two very familiar objects 
in person's life. The subjects undoubtedly had a great
Mood and Miaattribution
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daal of intaraction with thasa two itema and noat probably 
had aada an appraiaal of aach long bafora aakad by tha 
intarviawar. Daapita the fact that theaa very atrong 
evaluationa already axiated in the subjecta' memory and 
that tha mood waa induced merely by a pad of paper or a 
nail clipper, there waa a vary atrong affect on tha 
judgmenta made by tha aubjecta in a poaitiva mood. Not 
only ia tha affect of mood, at laaat on evaluationa, quite 
potent, but it can be produced by tha amallaat of 
manipulationa.
I will now turn to tha thaoriaa of mood'a influence on 
cognition. Tha firat theory involvaa mood aa a priming 
cue, treating mood aa an important cue of mamoriaa. Tha 
aaoond theory involvaa mood aa a aouroa of motivation, 
auggaating that poaitiva mood can aerve aa a goal and thua 
direct tha actiona of a parson. Tha third theory involvaa 
mood as information, and traata amotion aa a aource of 
information for daciaion making ana evaluation.
Mood aa a Priming Cue
Underatanding tha concept of priming requirea that 
certain aaaumptiona be made about tha way memory worka and 
tha way in which deciaiona and judgmenta are made.
Mood and Misattribution
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ttodela.at Memory
Understanding the theory of priming requires an 
adequate understanding of the way memory works.
Categorizing of information plays a central role in 
understanding how priming is thought to work. I shall take 
a brief look at two major theories of memory: the Bin
Model and the Network Model.
Thai Bln Model* As described by Wyer and Srull (1980), 
this model assumes that long term memory comprises storage 
bins which contain a concept or set of concepts. A unique 
label that identifies its contents is given to each bin.
Bins may contain information about specific people or 
events (e.g., your sister Mary or the trip to the cottage 
last weekend), prototypic people or events (e.g., a 
psychologist or a visit to the dentist), or general 
semantic concepts (e.g., aggressive, perilous, pleasant). 
The information contained in any one of these bins is known 
as a jghttlfl*
Material is usually contained in more than one bin.
For example, if James bought Carol a present, a 
representation of the incident would be stored in the bins 
labeled "James," "Carol," and a bin called NJames gives 
Carol a present.” in addition, a note about James might be
Hood and Misattribution
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placed in a bin labeled "Generous actions." Thus, a simple 
event would be stored in many places, according to the 
categories that could be derived from it.
Tile .ll.afl.el. More completely known as the
Associative Network Model (Anderson & Bower,1973), this is 
the older and more widely known of the two models. This 
model supposes that memory consists of units called nodes, 
which serves the same function as bins. Unlike the Bin 
Model, however, in which related memories are stored 
"inside" the bin, memories that are related to a particular 
node in question are also nodes themselves. Each node is 
connected to all the other nodes that are associated with 
it, forming interconnected clusters of associations. Using 
our previous example, "James," "Carol," "James gives Carol 
a present," and "Generous" would all have separate nodes 
and would all be connected to each other.
Itifi- AYailftbillty Principle
When people make decisions or judgments, they often use 
short-cuts, or heuristics, to make mental processing 
easier. One such heuristic is the use of whatever 
information is most available for decisions and judgments 
instead of trying to recall all pertinent data. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1972) called this the availability principle.
Mood and Misattribution
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Not only do people use these available thoughts as the 
basis for making judgments, but they also tend to assess 
frequency or probability of an event by the ease with which 
instances can be brought to mind. That is, the easier it 
is for a person to recall an event, the more likely a 
person will overestimate the frequency or probability of 
that event.
For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked subjcJts 
to read a list of names, half of which were male and half 
female. Although both genders were equally represented, 
subjects consistently overestimated the number of people 
belonging to the gender that contained a larger proportion 
of famous people. That is, if the list contained more 
famous women than famous men, subjects would say that there 
were more women on the list, even though the totals for 
males and females were exactly the same. The accessibility 
of the famous people led to an overestimation of the 
frequency of that gender in the list.
Theory of Priming
The theory of priming suggests that thinking about 
something makes related thoughts more easily accessible for 
judgments, decision making, or problem solving. For 
example, you may be wondering if you will have enough time
Mood and Misattribution
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to finish your project, and that reminds you to pick up 
your watch from the jewelers, which makes you think you 
also have to pick up some lawn fertilizer, which inspires 
you to start planning your garden, which makes you wonder 
what vegetables you'll have for dinner.
When a memory is accessed, it is said to be activated. 
In the Bin Model, this activation also causes the other 
bins to be opened, releasing related information. For the 
Network Model, activation at a node causes other nodes 
connected to it also to be activated, bringing related 
memories to mind. Whatever the process, the result is the 
same: memories related to the initial thought are made
more accessible and the person is more likely to think 
about them.
One of the earliest experiments done on priming 
involved the cued recall of material. Subjects' recall of 
material could be improved by cuing, or priming, their 
memory with certain words related to the memorized 
material.
Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) found that when subjects 
are asked to judge whether a letter string is a word, their 
response time decreases if it is preceded by an associated 
word rather than by an unrelated word or nonsense string.
Mood and Nisattribution
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For examplef Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) found that when 
subjects are shown a word such as doctor and then are asked 
whether nurse Is a word, they respond more quickly than if 
the first word had been computer or some other unrelated 
word.
Cognitive priming has been well documented in a variety 
of studies. Loftus (1973) found that subjects were able to 
recall an item from a category more quickly when cued with 
another instance from the category than if cued with 
unrelated words. Kozlowski (1977) found that cueing 
subjects with words that rhymed with the correct word 
improved recall success and speed. In addition, Gruneberg 
and Monks (1974) found a substantial improvement in 
attempted recall when subjects were cued by the first 
letter of the correct word.
Priming and Mood
Priming has its roots in the study of cognitive 
organization and memory, but it is not limited to purely 
cognitive effects.
Bower (1981) proposed that emotions as well as 
cognitive schemas serve as nodes in memory networks and 
function in much the same way. In terms of the network 
model, if a certain emotional node is activated, other
Mood and Misattribution
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nodes for schemas associated with that emotion should also 
be activated. Thus, subjects placed in a positive mood 
should recall more positive events from their lives. These 
memories, activated by the current mood, are referred to as 
mood congruent memories.
The memories that are primed become more available. As 
the availability principle states, this makes people more 
likely to use the primed information for decisions and 
judgments, sometimes to the point of error.
Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) found that subjects in a 
good mood exhibited faster reaction times when trying to 
recall positive material than neutral or negative material. 
This effect can be explained by assuming that the positive 
mood had primed positive memories, including the words to 
be recalled.
Rholes, Riskind, and Lane (1987) had subjects read 
statements about themselves (e.g., I am a very capable 
Pflrign or I am worthless) or had them read somatic 
descriptions of good or bad moods (e.g., I feel tired and 
listless or I feel energetic). After a mood had been 
induced, the subjects tried to recall positive or negative 
experiences from their lives. Rholes, et al. found that 
subjects who made statements about themselves recalled life
Mood and Misattribution
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events that matched the valence of their mood more quickly 
than events of the opposite valence.
Interestingly, the moods induced by somatic 
descriptions did not have a pronounced effect on the type 
of events recalled. One possible explanation, which I will 
discuss later, is that the attribution made by the subjects 
about the source of the mood is also important.
To the extent that judgments about a stimulus reflect 
what a person recalls about that stimulus, then 
explanations for mood-biased memories will also account for 
mood-biased judgments. Hence, the priming explanation for 
the effect of mood on judgment stresses the greater 
accessibility of mood congruent memories than non- 
congruent memories.
Effects of Priming of Mood on Judctmanta
Mood affects judgments. The effect of mood on memories 
was stressed as the explanation for the judgments in the 
shopping mall study by Isen et al. (1978) which was 
described earlier. A free gift induced a mildly positive 
mood among subjects. When they were later asked to make a 
judgment about their satisfaction with their televisions or 
automobiles, the positive aspects had already been primed, 
and thus were more accessible. As the availability
Mood and Misattribution
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principle would suggest, the subjects used the information 
that was most available to them to make their judgments: 
namely, the positive information relating to these two 
possessions.
Isen et al. performed another experiment in which 
subjects were exposed to a list of positively and 
negatively valenced words. Then they were asked to recall 
as many words as they could. Between the learning and the 
recall, one half of the group performed a task at which 
they succeeded, while the other performed a task in which 
they failed. As predicted, the subjects were better able 
to recall words that were consistent with their emotional 
state at the time of recall. That is, subjects who 
succeeded at their task recalled more positive words while 
subjects who failed recalled more negative words.
Isen and Shalker (1982) used two different means of 
inducing mood in their subjects. They used four groups, 
two with positive moods, one with a neutral mood, and one 
with a negative mood. The negative group and one of 
positive groups had their mood induced by success or 
failure on a fictitious test of perceptual-motor and 
problem-solving skills. The other positive group was 
NpaidN to be in a good mood: When subjects in this group
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entered the room, they found a dime on the chair where they 
were going to sit. They were told by the experimenter that 
the dime must have been dropped by a previous subject and 
that they could keep it.
The judgment stage came when subjects were shown three 
sets of slides. The first 16 were ambiguous; that is, they 
were rated near the center of a pleasantness scale by a 
control group. The last 12 were a random mixture of 
pleasant and unpleasant slides. As seen in Table 1, 
subjects who had either been successful on the standardized 
task or who had found a dime on the chair
Insert Table 1 about here
consistently rated slides, particularly the ambiguous ones, 
as more pleasant than either of the other two groups rated 
them. The interpretation was that the positive mood of the 
subjects caused them to be more attentive to positive 
elements of the slides, and thus the slides were reported 
as being more positive.
Mood and Misattribution
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Ef.ffes.ta. QX. MaQ.fl on Helping Behavior
Priming by mood affects not only judgments of how good 
or bad something is, but it also determines how likely a 
person is to perform some action such as helping behavior. 
Studies have consistently shown that people in p< tive 
moods are more likely to engage in some form of helping 
behavior*.
As in studies of priming, there are many ways of 
generating a mood and most seem to work equally well. One 
of the earliest studies in helping behavior was performed 
by Berkowitz and Conner in 1966, when they showed helping 
behavior could be affected by success at a performance 
task. Moore, Underwood, and Rosenhan (1973) found that 
merely thinking about pleasant thoughts could influence how 
willing people were to lend a hand to someone else. Isen 
and Levin (1972) were able to increase helping behavior by 
giving subjects a small bag of cookies.
Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith, and Taliaferro (1979) 
performed a field study in which subjects "chose 
themselves" by using a public pay phone in a hallway at the 
Student Union at the University of Kansas. The positive
*This assumes the person's good mood will not be put 
in jeopardy by helping. See Mood as a Source of Motivation.
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mood group found a in the coin return while the
control group found nothing. Further down the hallway, 
subjects encountered a chance to help someone in need: a
female confederate who rose from her chair as the subjects 
approached and spilled a large folder of paper. Positive 
mood subjects helped the confederate 90% of the time while 
the control group helped only 60% of the time.
To explain the phenomenon, Batson et al. adopted an 
interpretation by Isen et al. (1978), which suggested that 
the enhanced mood had led to the recall of more positive 
aspects of prior similar situations. When the subjects 
decided whether to help or not, the positive results of 
helping were more available if the subject was in a good 
mood. As a result, they decided to help.
Mood as a Source of Motivation
The second theory about the cognitive influence of mood 
centers more on the mood itself than its effects. Here, I 
shall focus on decision making (more particularly, risk 
taking) rather than judgments, as motivational elements 
(reasons to perform an action) often come into play in 
decision making. Most people probably assume that people 
in positive moods are more willing to take ri:'b than 
people in negative or neutral moods. Evidence from
Mood and Misattribution
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research, however, seems to Indicate that the opposite 
occurs in many situations,
Elfcggtg on Decision Making
Isen and Patrick (1983) gave subjects 10 poker chips 
and told them the chips represented their credit for 
participating in the experiment. In the experiment, they 
were going to play roulette and they could bet as many of 
their chips as they chose to. If they had more than 10 
chips when the experiment ended, they would get credit for 
participating plus an additional prize, commensurate with 
the number of chips they won. If they had less than 10 
chips when the experiment ended, they would not receive 
credit for participating.
There were two manipulations: affect of the subjects
(positive and neutral) and chance of winning (low, medium, 
high)• Positive affect was induced by giving the subjects 
one McDonald's gift certificate.
Given the priming hypothesis, subjects in a positive 
mood should bet more than the subjects in a neutral mood. 
The subjects in a good mood should have more pleasant 
memories primed, making a positive outcome seem more 
likely, and thus making them more likely to bet.
The results from the experiment are shown in Table 2.
Mood and Misattribution
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Insert Table 2 about here
As expected, the positive affect subjects did bet 
significantly more than the neutral mood subjects, in the 
low and medium risk groups. However, the trend was 
reversed in the high risk group. The positive mood 
subjects bet much less than they bet in the other two 
situations, and they bet considerably less than the neutral 
mood subjects in the same situation.
The explanation involves the motivation of the 
subjects. One hypothesis is that people who are in good 
moods want to preserve their moods, and thus are less 
willing to take risks that might jeopardize those moods.
The evidence suggests that when people are in a good mood, 
they want to stay that way. This is a sort of emotional 
protectionism. For the high risk condition, not only are a 
large number of chips at stake, but so is the valuable 
positive mood.
When the risks are low, motivation is not nearly as 
important. Even when good mood subjects lost, their mood 
was maintained because the loss was trivial. Here priming
Mood and Misattribution
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may ba more cantral: subjects overestimate the likelihood
of success and are very willing to bet.
People who are in negative or neutral moods are likely 
to be motivated to achieve positive mood states and thus 
may take the higher risks. Now the motivation works the 
other way: people who are in bad moods risk regardless of
possible cost, because they have nothing to lose and a 
positive mood to gain.
Evidence supports both of these predictions. I shall 
review several studies which show this effect of mood as a 
motivational factor.
Itisk of mood can be induced by placing the subject in a 
mood, and then in a real life decision situation, where 
there is a chance of loss and a chance of gain. This is 
typically done through a gambling scenario (e.g., "You have 
a 50% chance of losing $100 and a 50% chance of winning 
$200. Do you want to take the gamble?").
Another technique involves helping behavior. Subjects' 
positive moods can be put in jeopardy by placing them in a 
real life situation where they have the option of helping 
someone else or not helping. If some satisfaction is 
obtained from helping others, and if at the same time 
particularly demanding social behaviors can be unpleasant
Mood and Misattribution
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to perform, then the scenario of helping someone is almost 
identical to the situation of gambling: The subject, after
being placed in a mood, is presented with a situation in 
which there is a chance for gain and a chance for loss, and 
a decision must be made that will affect which occurs.
In the aforementioned study by Isen and Levin (1972), 
some subjects were given a small packet of cookies while 
studying in a library. Controls were given nothing. When 
the subjects were asked to volunteer to help a confederate, 
the positive mood subjects helped more. However, when 
another confederate, unknown to the subject, approached and 
requested aid in a task that would annoy other students in 
the library, the same positive mood subjects volunteered 
less often than controls.
When there was little risk involved in losing a good 
mood, subjects in enhanced moods were more willing to help, 
as the priming theory would predict. But when called upon 
to perform a task that would irritate someone else, and 
thus probably weaken or possibly destroy the subject's good 
mood, the response was the opposite. Once placed in a good 
mood, a person will protect that mood and avoid situations 
where there is a high probability of losing it.
Mood and Misattribution
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Weyant (1978) found supporting evidence in his study of 
263 college students. Using bogus aptitude tests, he 
induced positive and negative moods in students. Then he 
asked them to volunteer to help get donations for one of 
two charities. In the high cost (ie., high mood-risk) 
condition, subjects were asked to go door to door to 
collect donations for Little League baseball. In the low 
cost (ie., low mood-risk) condition, subjects were merely 
asked to sit at a donation desk. Weyant found that 
subjects in positive moods were more willing to perform the 
low risk task than the neutral or negative mood subjects, 
but less willing to perform the high risk task.
In a similar study, Ioen and Simmonds (1978) induced 
good moods by placing dimes in a public phone for subjects 
to find. Subjects in a good mood were more willing than 
control subjects to help someone by reading and evaluating 
statements they were told would make them fee1 good, but 
less willing to help when they were told the statements 
might put them in a bad mood. Again, mood can act as a 
commodity, to be sought after, enhanced, or protected.
Mood as a Source of Information
Emotion is probably also a source of information about 
an individual's reactions to a particular person, risk, or
Hood and Misattribution
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poasibla action. Tha theory states that when people are 
called upon to sake judgaents or decisions, they examine 
their own feelings and use these feelings as a source of 
objective information that indicates their reaction to or 
appraisal of something. That is, people infer what their 
own appraisals of situations are much as an outsider would 
if the same emotional information was available. This 
idea, of examining one's own feelings from an objective 
point of view as a clue to one's own reaction, is important 
in understanding the idea of attribution.
Attribution
Attribution refers to the process of ascribing one's 
own reactions to a cause. The basic premise is that the 
process of forming reactions to stimuli is not entirely 
conscious, and that we take stock of our feelings and try 
to figure out what causes us to feel the way we do.
The most common way to study this attribution effect is 
by inducing mis-attribution. That is, the subject is 
presented with a stimulus that invokes a reaction, then is 
induced to attribute that reaction to another stimulus.
White and Kight (1984) used male subjects who were 
physically aroused by running in place. A few bogus tests 
were administered and then subjects were shown a film of a
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female confederate. They were asked to judge how much they 
were attracted to the female in the film.
There were three independent variables. One was the 
salience of the source of arousal. That is, how obvious 
was it that the reason for the physiological arousal was 
the exercise? In the high salience situation, clues to 
remind the subject about the exercise were left about as 
conspicuously as possible. For example, the jump rope was 
left hanging on the chair, a blood pressure cuff was left 
on the subject's arm, and the subject watched the video 
tape of the female in the same room where he exercised, 
with the lights on. In the low salience situation, the 
exercise and blood pressure test were performed in one room 
and the video tape was viewed in another room.
The second variable was confederate salience - whether 
the subject expected to meet the female or not. Under high 
confederate salience, the subject expected to meet the 
female and was told the experimenter was interested in how 
attracted they would be to each other. Under low 
confederate salience, the subject was told that the 
experimenter was comparing his reactions with the 
confederate and that the subject would not meet the
Mood and Nisattribution
confederate.
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The third variable was the level of arousal. High 
arousal subjects exercised for 120 sec while the low 
arousal subjects only exercised for 15 sec.
White and Kight expected the high arousal, low exercise 
salience, high confederate salience group to report the 
most attraction toward the confederate. The results 
agreed: those subjects who experienced high arousal, had
few cues to its real source, and who expected to meet the 
female from the film indicated they were strongly attracted 
to her. High arousal added to the natural attraction of 
the subjects toward the confederate only when they 
misattributed their arousal to an imminent meeting with 
this female.
Thus misattribution occurs only when the subject has 
some type of arousal to attribute, when the real cause for 
the arousal is not obvious or palient, and when the subject 
has some other possible cause to attribute the arousal to.
Several studies have used alcohol as a means of 
inducing arousal in subjects. McCarty, Diamond, and Kaye 
(1982) found that when subjects who were given alcoholic 
drinks were told they were non-alcoholic and then asked 
them to judge sexual slides, they rated them as more 
arousing than controls. Believing that the arousal they
Mood and Misattribution
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were experiencing not to have been caused by the drink, the 
subjects misattributed and decided they were very aroused 
by the slides.
Effects of Attribution of Mood on Judgments
Arousal is assumed to be valence free. It is an 
important aspect of emotion and hence can contribute to 
subjects' interpretations about their affective reactions, 
but it is not itself an emotion. However, the same 
misattribution effects can take place if moods and emotions 
themselves are manipulated instead of merely physiological 
arousal.
The paradigm remains the same: if a subject believes
that his or her preexisting emotional feelings are a 
reaction to a particular object, any evaluation of that 
object will be biased in an emotionally-congruent way, 
whether or not those feelings were actually produced by the 
object.
From this point of view, affective feelings represent 
cognitive appraisals of the personal significance of 
situations. Ordinarily, such reactions provide accurate 
feedback about, me's appraisal; it is the representation of 
such appraisals that convey the nature and intensity of 
one's reaction to the relevance of the event for one's
Mood and Misat ition
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concerns (Clore, 1988). Under certain condition* ever,
reactions can be misattributed to irrelevant stiiiu 
resulting in biased judgments and decisions.
Schwarz and Clore (1983) performed two experiments to 
study the misattribution of mood. In the first experiment, 
mood was induced by asking subjects for vivid descriptions 
of recent happy or sad events. The experiment was 
conducted in a soundproof room; subjects were told the room 
would make them feel one of three ways: "tense and
depressed," Melated and kind of high,H or no information 
was provided at all. The subjects were asked to report 
general life satisfaction and happiness.
Misattribution was successfully generated. As 
predicted, subjects in bad moods, who had been told the 
room would make them feel uneasy, reported more 
satisfaction with their lives than subjects who were in a 
bad mood but had no prior expectations about the room.
When they were asked to judge satisfaction, the subjects 
examined how they felt (bad), realized they felt that way 
because of the room (or so they thought), and thus did not 
us© those negative feelings to make judgments about their 
lives. This has been referred to as the discounting effect 
(Kelley, 1971), because the subjects discounted aspects of
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their own lives as a cause for their bad mood when they 
were given an alternate explanation, namely the soundproof 
room. On the other hand, subjects who were in bad moods 
and expected to be in good moods from the room reported 
less satisfaction with their lives. They expected the room 
to make them feel good, but found they felt bad, and 
decided this must have been because of unhappiness with 
their liv«s.
Subjects in a positive mood did not try to attribute 
their mood to the room, regardless of expectations.
Subjects in positive moods had no need to discount their 
lives as reasons for their mood, and in fact did not want 
to. Feeling good about one's life is not something one 
wants to avoid.
In a second experiment, subjects again rated their life 
happiness and satisfaction. To achieve different moods in 
this experiment, subjects were called on rainy and sunny 
days, which is a valid predictor of mood. People 
misattribute their bad feelings caused by bad weather to 
their lives and thus report lower satisfaction on these 
days. Schwarz and Clore tried to get people to correct 
this misattribution and to give them a chance to discount 
their situation as the cause for their moods.
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Subjects were called on the phone and asked questions 
about their satisfaction and happiness with life, 
presumably for an out-of-town university study. Some 
subjects, the no-priming group, were told nothing else. 
Other subjects were partially primed by a question 
immediately before the main questions: MBy the way, how is
the weather down there?” The rest of the subjects were 
fully primed, and told that the purpose of the call was to 
examine the effect of weather on people's moods.
The results, which are shown in Table 3, are consistent 
with the results from the previous experiment.
Insert Table 3 about here
When their attention was drawn to the weather, subjects 
in a negative mood attributed their bad mood to the bad 
weather and thus reported high satisfaction. Bad-mood 
subjects for whom weather was not salient, however, 
attributed their bad feelings to their life situations and 
thus reported lower life satisfaction.
Since this research was published, a number of other 
experiments aimed at comparing predictions of the priming 
and informational models have been performed.
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Clore (1985) and Schwarz and Clore (1988) summarize a 
number of unpublished studies. The priming hypothesis 
predicts that mood will have some effect at encoding, when 
the subjects first form an interpretation of the stimulus. 
That is, affect at the time a novel stimulus is presented 
can determine how it is judged at recall. For example, if 
a person is in a positive mood when he or she encounters a 
stranger, then facets about that stranger will be encoded 
in positive terms. Hence, when asked later to evaluate the 
stranger, even negative affect should have little effect on 
the judgment, since there would be little negative material 
to be primed, and the stranger would therefore be judged 
positively.
The informational hypothesis, however, predicts that 
mood effects will occur primarily at the time of judgment. 
According to this theory, while the mood at the time of 
encoding may play a role in the judgment, the mood at 
judgment is really what determines how judgments are made. 
Thus even if the person had been in a positive mood when a 
stranger was first encountered, a negative mood at the time 
of judgment should result in a negative evaluation.
Research by Clore, Parrott, Wilkins, and Schwarz (in 
preparation) supports this prediction, showing that mood
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effects occur at the time of judgment rather than during 
encoding.
The priming interpretation also predicts that mood 
effects should occur only when judgments are made about 
ambiguous stimuli. Ambiguous information is open to biased 
interpretation on the basis of available concepts primed by 
mood, whereas unambiguous information should be less so.
The informational hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests 
that mood is primarily used as information about one's 
reaction to the stimulus, so that the ambiguity of the 
stimulus is not a primary issue.
Wyer and Srull (1986) showed that judgments about 
objects can and often do occur without the subject 
accessing what they call Permanent Storage (similar to Long 
Term Memory), which is where all of the information on well 
known stimuli would be stored. They suggest that 
evaluations are made on the basis of readily available 
material in the Working Space (similar to Short Term 
Memory), which would contain the mood at the time of 
recall. Therefore, judgments could be made about even a 
well Known item on the basis of mood at the time of recall 
alone. Consistent with this interpretation, Clore,
Schwarz, and Robbins (1985) showed that mood affects
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positive, negative, and ambiguous objects of judgment 
equally.
Method
Overview
The experiment was conducted in a small soundproof room 
in the Psychology building. Subjects were placed in a 
positive or negative mood through their description of a 
happy or sad event. Half of the subjects were made to 
attribute their mood to the soundproof room, and the other 
half were not encouraged to make such an external 
attribution. Subjects were then asked to answer questions 
about eight monetary gambles, indicating goodness, 
probability, and choice for each gamble.
Subjects
Subjects were 66 undergraduates (33 males and 33 
females) enrolled at the University of Illinois and 
participating in the study for course credit.
Two subjects of the same sex were run at a time in the 
small soundproof room where the experiment was carried out. 
Subjects were told that the study was being conducted 
there, since it was the only room available at that time. 
They were also told that in previous studies, subjects had 
reported feeling unusual after spending a period of time in 
the room. Positive mood subjects were told they reported 
feeling happy or giddy, while negative mood subjects were
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told they reported feeling anxious or uneasy. All subjects 
were then asked to fill out a rating sheet for the room, 
answering questions about size, ventilation, lighting 
conditions, and how uneasy and anxious (or happy and giddy) 
it made them feel. For half of the subjects, the rating 
forms were immediately collected, and for the other half 
they were collected later.
To induce mood, subjects were instructed to write about 
a recent experience. The positive mood group was told to 
write about a happy event, while the negative mood group 
was told to write about a sad event. In addition, subjects 
in the positive group were given hard candy before the 
experiment began.
Subjects were told they would have fifteen minutes in 
which to write about the event, but were interrupted after 
only eight minutes, supposedly in the interest of time.
This was done to increase the potency of the mood 
manipulation, since it has been shown that subjects who are 
interrupted from writing about an affectively laden event 
show a greater tendency to make ratings congruent with the 
mood than subjects who are allowed to finish their 
descriptions (Martin, 1986).
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At this point, the room rating forms were collected 
from the other half of the subjects. This procedure was 
intended to remind them that the room might them feel a 
certain way, and cause them to attribute their feelings to 
the room.
Eight gambles of the following forms were presented to 
each subject:
Suppose you were given a choice between receiving $3000 
with certainty or having an 85% chance of winning 
$5000.
Suppose you were given a choice between LOSING $3000 
with certainty or having an 85% chance of LOSING $5000 
(vs a 15% chance of losing nothing).
All gambles offered the choice between a certain gain 
(or loss) versus the possibility of either winning (or 
losing) a larger amount or winning (or losing) nothing.
The presentation of each gamble was followed by three 
questions. They first asked subjects to rate how good it 
would be if they took the gamble and won (or lost nothing) 
or how bad it would be to take the gamble and lose (or win 
nothing).
The eight gambles represented, therefore, the 
combinations of win versus loss (Result) for large versus
Noc and Miaattribution
37
■nail amounts (Siz ad in questions which focusad 
subjects' attantioi ithar on taking tha ganbla and winning 
or taking the gamble and loaing (Emphasis).
Tha praaantation of tha conditiona for gamblea wera 
followad in aach casa by threa question*, which provided 
tha values for the dependent variables. The first one 
(Goodness) asked about the goodness of winning or the 
badness of losing:
How good do you feel it would be to take the gamble and 
win the $5000?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Hot at all
The second (Probability) asked about the subjective 
likelihood of actually winning the gamble:
To what extent do you feel you would actually win if 
you took the gamble?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Not at all
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The third question (Choice) asked subjects to choose 
between a certain gain (or loss) and a possible larger gain
(or loss).
Imagine that you are faced with that choice and 
indicate which you would actually choose.
85%
Chance of Winning
Winning $3000 with
$5000
• t • •
• • • « • • • •
Certainty
. . . .
. . . .
definitely probably can't probably definitely
choose choose decide choose choose
All subjects received the same gambles, except that 
half of the subjects had the order of the first two gambles 
reversed. Thus the first ami second gambles for one half 
were the second and first gambles for the other half. The 
gambles differed only in * hat one dealt with a possible 
large win situation while the other dealt with a possible 
large loss situation. It vas felt that considering a loss 
gamble first would focus subjects on avoiding losses for 
the remainder of the gambles, while considering a win 
gamble first would focus subjects on achieving gains. The
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order of the remaining six questions we*s identical for both 
halves*
After subjects completed all of the gambles, they 
filled out a mood rating scale, on which they ranked how 
happy and how sad they felt* The self-rating was described 
as a further check of the effect of the soundproof room.
'inally, all of the subjects were given a complete 
debriefing, in which the nature of the study and purpose of 
the soundproof room were fully explained. Upon 
questioning, several subjects reported they did not believe 
the deception involving the room, but none were able to 
guess the true intention of it.
Results
The analysis involved three between group variables 
(mood x attribution x order) and three repeated measures 
variables (size x emphasis x result). A 2x2x2x2x2x2 
analysis of variance (mood x order x attribution x size x 
result x emphasis) was done.
I will review the results with a section devoted to 
each of the following concerns: the manipulation of mood,
the influence of gamble type on choice of risk, the effect 
of mood on risk, the effect of mood on probability 
estimates, the effect of misattribution on mood effects, 
and the relationship between questions of goodness, 
probability, and choice. 
validation of Mood Manipulation
A check of the effectiveness of the mood manipulation 
showed it to be effective. When mood was expressed as 
ratings of happiness minus sadness, the mood manipulation 
had a significant effect on mood self-rating, £(65) = 2.36, 
p < .05. When the happy and sad items were analyzed 
separately, self-ratings of sadness, but not self-ratings 
of happiness, showed a significant effect of the happy 
versus sad mood manipulation.
40
Mood and Misattribution
41
Influence of Gamble Typeon Choice of Risk
Several aspects of the gambles Influenced risk-taking, 
but the size of the possible win or loss proved to be the 
most important dimension, £(1,58) * 48*36, p < .001* As 
seen in Table 4, subjects were more willing to
Insert Table 4 about here
take risks on small gambles (M = 4.163) than on large 
gambles (U = 5.576) (Note: large numbers indicate a 
preference for certainty, or less risk-taking.).
A second effect on risk-taking was a main effect for 
emphasis, £(1,58) * 7.9, p < .01. Emphasis refers to 
whether the initial question about each gamble asked how 
good a win would be or how bad a loss would be. When the 
questions drew attention to the goodness of a possible win, 
then subjects took more risks (H * 4.720) than when the 
questions drew attention to the badness of a possible loss 
(M = 5.019).
Another effect on risk-taking, though less significant, 
was a main effect for the result of the gamble, £(1,58) * 
3.5, p < .07. When the gambles involved the possibility of
41
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winning money, subjects showed a greater preference toward 
risk-taking (M = 4.549) than when the gambles involved the 
possibility of losing money (M * 5.190).
The EfflStJBf Mood on Risk
The most interesting effect was a mood x order x 
attribution x size interaction, £(1,58) - 6.05, p < .02.
The cell means from the interaction (in Table 5) show 
that mood affected mainly small gambles only. Choices
Insert Table 5 about here
depended on whether subjects had an initial orientation 
toward avoiding losses or achieving gains (i.e., the order 
variable)• The most dramatic effects occurred when 
subjects were motivated to achieve gains (i.e., the first 
gamble they answered questions about was a large win 
gamble)• The differences of interest are in the non­
attribution condition (in which the room was not made 
salient as a possible cause for subjects' feelings). When 
they considered gambles with small risks, subjects in the 
non-attribution condition showed a dramatic preference for
42
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certainty when sad (M - 5.16) and an equally dramatic 
preference for risk when happy (M * 3.33).
In the case of subjects with an orientation toward 
avoiding losses (ie. having received a large loss gamble 
first), small gambles had a very different effect. In 
these cases, there was no longer a sizable difference, and 
indeed there was a trend toward happy, non-attribution 
subjects preferring certainty (H « 4.56) while the sad 
subjects were risk oriented (M - 3.81).
The ElfesL-fllMood Qn Subifegtlvs Probability Estimates
Mood effects occurred for some probability estimates as 
well as the risk estimates. As seen in Table 6, mood
Insert Table 6 about here
effects for probability estimates were seen most 
prominently in loss situations (whether large or small 
losses), particularly in light of a mood x emphasis 
interaction, £(1,58) * 4.80, p < .05. Sad subjects who 
were asked about the goodness of a win were more 
pessimistic about their chances of winning than happy 
subjects in the same condition. The opposite was true for
43
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subjacts who were asked about the badness of a loss; under 
these condition, happy subjects were more pessimistic than 
sad subjects.
The Effect of Misattribution on Mood Effects
Looking back to the interaction tabled in Table 5, the 
effect of subjects' attributions can be seen clearly. For 
all attribution subjects (whose affective reactions at the 
tine of judgment were explained away to the soundproof 
room), there was no longer an effect of mood. Happy (M =* 
4.56) and sad (U - 3.69) subjects who had been oriented 
toward achieving gains no longer difiwred significantly, 
just as the happy (M ■ 3.84) and sad (H - 4.41) subjects 
who had been oriented toward avoiding losses failed to 
differ significantly.
Relationship Between Goodness. Probability and Choice 
A brief investigation of Table 7 shows s- 
correlations between the goodness of winning, probability 
of winning, and choice of risk when winning was emphasized. 
When the four correlations in this condition between 
goodness and probability were averaged, r - .50. In 
addition, rating the risky alternative as especially good 
was also related to risk-taking, average r - .71. Finally,
44
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tha subjactiva probability of winning was also ralatad to 
risk-taking for thasa subjact for whoa tha quastions 
aaphasisad winning (r - .5).
Mian tha badnass of losing was aaphasizad, rasults wars 
aixad but largaly statistically insignificant. Tha only 
significant ralationship for thasa subjacts was that rating 
losing as worsa tandad to laad to incraasad optiaisa, 
avaraga r - .28.
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Discussion
Overall, gambles of the type studied here are of 
interest precisely because most people show an exaggerated 
preference for certainty, even when, on the basis of the 
expected value of the alternatives, the risky choice is 
advantageous. In the present study we hoped to reduce this 
preference in order to increase the likelihood of detecting 
the effects of other variables. It is interesting, 
therefore, to note what variables change this somewhat 
surprising tendency toward conservatism. On the basis of 
the present results, there appear to be two kinds of 
relevant variables: gamble variables and subject
variables.
The most effective gamble variable was size; subjects 
were significantly more willing to take risks when they 
involved small rather than large amounts. Less important 
was whether the questions focused subjects' attention on 
winning or losing (Emphasis), and whether the gamble 
involved losses or gains (Result)• Gambles that were most 
likely to result in risk-taking were those in which winning 
was emphasized and involved potential gains.
The subject variable of relevance was mood. When there 
was a significant mood effect, it generally pointed toward 
subjects in happy noods exhibiting a greater tendency to
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take risks. What emerges, then, is a more or less 
consistent tendency for subjects to avoid risk except when 
potential losses are minimal, when winning is made more 
salient, and when they are in positive moods.
In the present study there were no effects of mood on 
evaluation of the goodness of winning or the badness of 
losing. In a related vein, Weber and Clore (1988) also 
found no effects of mood on ratings of the attractiveness 
of gambles.
With respect to probabilities, there were mood effects 
on some gambles. In particular, mood effects were found 
when the gamble was introduced by questions that encouraged 
subjects to focus on winning rather than losing (e.g., 
rating the goodness of winning rather than the badness of 
losing)• When the gambles involved losses (either small or 
large) and winning was emphasized (by the wording of the 
question), sad subjects were more pessimistic than were 
happy subjects, with sad subjects rating the gambles as 
less likely to have a positive result than happy people 
did. When losses were emphasized, on the other hand, happy 
subjects were more pessimistic.
With respect to choices, the nature of the mood effects 
depended on whether the session began with a large win or a
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large loss gamble. The effects of this variable /ere 
surprisingly consistent. We assume that considering a loss 
gamble first made subjects approach the remainder of the 
gambles with a motivation to avoid losses, while those who 
began the session with a large win gamble were subsequently 
motivated to achieve gains. When motivated to achieve 
gains, happy subjects were more likely to take risks than 
were sad subjects. Sad subjects, on the other hand, 
indicated a preference for certainty. When motivated to 
avoid Josses, subjects in general tended to be more 
conservative, choosing certainty more often than risk, with 
little difference between happy and sad subjects. When 
either group was given a chance to attribute away their 
mood to the room, mood effects disappeared, and mood was no 
longer associated with a preference for either certainty or 
risk-taking.
The question arises as to why the loss-first group did 
not show a similar effect. The answer may be related to a 
motivation on the part of the loss-first group toward 
avoiding losses (rather than toward achieving gains), since 
risk-taking behavior was seen only in situations in which 
winning was emphasized. In a sense, then, mood can be 
thought of as one more variable whose influence is not
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unlika the several situational variables such as Size 
(email versus large gambles), Order (win first versus loss 
first), Emphasis (whether the questions ask about wins or 
losses), and Result (whether the gamble involves possible 
wins versus losses). Whenever winning was made salient and 
significant losses were deemphasized, risk-taking was more 
likely. Only when these influences converge, do we see a 
genuine tendency toward risk-taking, the most important of 
these influences being mood, order, and size of the gamble.
Taking as a default model, a basic subjective expected 
utility function, it might be assumed that a subject's 
choice of whether to take a risk or not, depended, in part, 
on the value he placed on the amount that could be won and 
the likelihood of winning it. One question that can be 
asked, therefore, is whether there is any evidence that 
these factors played a role. Relevant evidence comes from 
the correlation matrix in Table 7. As previously alluded 
to, large, consistent, and sensible relationships obtained 
between value, subjective probability, and choice appeared 
only in the win emphasized conditions. When subjects were 
encouraged to focus on the badness of losing, inconsistent 
and unexpected relationships resulted.
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Results of the study provide support for the theory of 
misattribution, as well as further evidence of a 
motivational influence on risk-taking. As we expected, sad 
and happy moods were Induced, and significant mood effects 
were observed, which disappeared under attribution 
conditions, indicating subjects had discounted their mood 
to the soundproof room.
Just as Isen (1983) found in a gambling study, the most 
risk-taking was found in subjects who were in happy moods 
and were presented with small gambles. That is, happy 
subjects showed the most risk-taking, but only when the 
stakes were low, so as to protect their positive mood. On 
a bigger scale, the results seem to suggest that happy 
people do not tend to take large, irrational gambles that 
you might associate with someone in a good mood. Happy 
people are cautious when faced with large gambles, not 
foolish.
Finally, one of the most important observations to be 
made about the data is that there is a particular set of 
conditions that is required to observe mood or attribution 
effects. Specifically, people (regardless of mood) will 
take risks only when that risk is minimized (e.g., the size 
of the amble is small, the possibility of winning is
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amphasizad, ate.). in iddition to tha aaphaaia of tha 
quastion askad, tha siza of tha gaabla, and aood of tha 
subjact, othar variablas such aa whathar tha subjact is 
oriantad toward achiaving gains or avoiding lossas saan to 
ba iaportant.
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Table 1
Moan Ratings of the Pleasant. Unpleasant, and Ambiguous 
Slide from Subiacta in Each Mood Condition
Mood
Condition
Slide Type
Pleasant Ambiguous Unpleasant
Dina 6.28 5.14 3.55
Success 6.36 4.83 3.28
Control 6.01 4.73 3.33
Failure 5.84 4.11 2.84
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Table 2
Moan Number of Chios Bet. Variances, and Proportion of 
Subjects Batting, in Each of Six Conditions
Condition Positive affect Neutral affect
High Risk 
Mean
Variance 
Proportion 
Moderate Risk 
Mean
Variance 
Proportion 
Low Risk 
Mean 
Variance 
Proportion
.455
.89
3/11, .27
4.1 
12.89 
7/10, .70
3.67
3.56
11/12, .92
2.56 
12.25
4/9, .44
2.75
3.19
9/12, .75
1.54
6.56
4/13, .31
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Tabla 3
Maan Rating* of canarai Happinaaa. Daaira to Chanca, and 
Lifa SatiafactIon t Kraarinant 2
Dapandant
Priming
variabla Nona Indirect Direct
Oanaral Happinaaa
Sunny 7.43 7.29 7.79
Rainy 5.00 Ooa 6.93
Daaira to Change
Sunny 3.93 3.43 3.57
Rainy 5.79 4.57 4.93
Li fa Satiafaction
Sunny 6.57 6.79 7.21
Rainy 4.16 6.71 7.07
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Maan Cholca for Each Gambia Tvpa
Tabla 4
Eaphaala
G a m b i a _______________________ _ _
Typa Min Losa
Min
Small 3.818 3.636
Largo 5.697 5.045
Looo
small 4.606 4.591
Largo 5.955 5.606
Nota. Larga numbors indicata a tandanoy toward cartainty
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Table 5
Mean Choice for Each Gamble Type bv Mood of Subject bv 
Motivational Orientation
Attribution
None Room
Mood and Orientation Orientation
Gaable Size Achieve Avoid Achieve Avoid
Oains Losses Gains Losses
Sad
Saall Gaable 3.81 5.16 4.41 3.69
Large Gaable 5.88 5.56 5.22 5.28
Happy
Saall Gaable 4.56 3.33 3.84 4.56
Large Gaable 5.64 5.25 5.91 5.91
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Maan Subiactiva Probability of Winning
Tabla 6
Raault of Gaabla
Loss Win
Baphasis Eaphaaia
Badnaas Goodnasa Badness Goodness
Mood of Loaa of Win of Loaa of Win
Sad 2 a 48 2.56 flOen 3.37
Happy 3.12 4.82 3.63 3.43
Kota. High nuabara indicata pasaiaiaa.
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Corralationa batwaan Goodnasa and Probability. Goodness and 
Choica, and Probability and Choict bv Gambia Tvps
Tabla 7
Corralation Pair*
Gambia Typa Good/Prob Good/Choica Prob/Cholca
Win Emphasis
Largo Gambia
Win .54 .69 .50
Loss .40 .59 .37
Small Gambia
Win .59 .80 .55
Loss .56 .76 • 58
Loss Emphasis
Larga Gambia
Win .24 I • o * -.42
Loss .28 -.12 -.28
Small Gambia
win .12 -.28 • 32
Loss .49 -.17 -.10
